Bagaimana CUAN dari IHSG sekarang

Summary

John Daniel Rahmat argued that Indonesia’s market weakness could create opportunities, but warned that rebounds may be misleading if underlying problems remain unresolved. His central concern was MSCI’s consultation on potentially reclassifying Indonesia from an emerging market to a “stand-alone” market, which he said could prompt foreign index funds to sell Indonesian equities.

Market outlook and MSCI concerns

• Rahmat said the IHSG/JCI had risen about 53% from April 2025 to January 2026, then fallen about 41%, before rebounding roughly 25% from its low. He argued that the rebound was not supported by enough fundamentally strong stocks.
• He compared the rebound with the Dow Jones after 1929: it rebounded about 48% before later falling 86% from the rebound high over more than two years. His caution was not to treat a rally as proof that a downturn is over.
• He described MSCI’s key concern as opaque shareholding and coordinated trading that undermines price formation—what he informally called “fried stocks.” He said disclosure or free-float measures alone would not address the issue unless the trading practices stopped.
• In his analysis, only 5–6 of 22 stocks driving the earlier rally, and 8 of 21 stocks contributing to the later rebound, were fundamentally strong. He also estimated that an IHSG excluding his selection of 20 “fried stocks” would have been around 4,700, versus a reported index level of about 6,071 at the time. He stressed that 4,700 was not a forecast of the market bottom.
• He expected a possible stand-alone reclassification, saying the consultation was due to close at the end of April and a decision could come by the end of June. He warned that the effective date could come earlier. He also said foreign index funds might wait for the formal decision before selling, and that liquidating positions could take a month or more.
• He estimated that 60–70% of foreign investors in Indonesian equities were index funds. He said Indonesia’s weight in regional indices had fallen from nearly 3% in 2011 to roughly 0.35–0.5%, making Indonesia relatively small for global index providers.
• He cited performance from around December 2019 to September 30 of about −3.6% for the IHSG, versus approximately −38% for MSCI Indonesia and −45% for FTSE Indonesia. These figures and dates are as presented in the talk.

Strategies discussed

• Wait for potential index-driven selling before buying fundamentally sound shares. Rahmat’s first approach was to wait until a possible MSCI/FTSE decision and the associated selling had played out, then consider quality stocks at lower prices. He did not give specific entry levels or a timetable for a market bottom.
• Dividend-investing framework:
  • Prioritize companies with strong management and a credible ability to grow dividends per share.
  • Compare dividend yield with the 10-year government bond yield, while accounting for Rahmat’s view that Indonesia’s bond spread was unusually narrow.
  • With Indonesia’s 10-year yield around 7.2–7.3%, the US 10-year yield around 5.3%, and his estimated “fair” spread at 5 percentage points rather than the then-current 2 points, he put a target dividend yield at about 10.5%, or at least 11%.
  • He said this strategy should be used only when prices are distressed—not simply because a stock’s current dividend yield looks high. He cautioned that dividends can fall.
• Short selling: Rahmat described short selling as an alternative that could be used immediately, but said Indonesian short sales were intraday only and subject to daily volume limits.
  • The basic trade is to sell first and buy back later at a lower price.
  • He suggested focusing on BBCA and ASII, which he said were more closely affected by foreign flows. He also named INDF among five stocks he might short; the other two named were the more speculative BRPT and BUMI, about which he expressed greater caution.
  • He warned that prices could be pushed higher temporarily, making short selling risky, and said it was unsuitable for investors with low risk tolerance.
  • He mentioned Ajaib and Semesta as brokers then permitted to offer short selling, while disclosing no business connection with them.
• He repeatedly advised investors to understand why they own a stock rather than copy other people’s trades.

Macro, bonds and credit risk

• Rahmat said foreign equity outflows could put pressure on the rupiah as investors convert proceeds into dollars. He warned that a sharp currency decline could also undermine demand for Indonesian bonds.
• He described global government-bond markets as under pressure, with yields in the US, UK, Japan, Australia, Germany and France at multi-year highs. He said Indonesia’s yield increase had been relatively modest, leaving the US–Indonesia 10-year yield spread at around 2 percentage points.
• He cited S&P downside-risk markers, including government debt rising by more than 3% of GDP annually and government interest costs exceeding 15% of tax revenue on a sustained basis. He said the latter ratio had been around 18% and could reach 18.9%, making a future downgrade more plausible if it remained elevated.
• He said a stand-alone classification would not automatically trigger a credit-rating downgrade, but could add to negative investor sentiment. He also noted that countries can return to investible classifications if the underlying issues are resolved.

Assets, securities and indices mentioned

• Indices and markets: IHSG/JCI, MSCI Indonesia, FTSE Indonesia, S&P 500, Dow Jones and Asia-Pacific indices.
• Stocks and tickers: BBCA, BBRI, BMRI, BBNI, TLKM, ASII, UNTR, INDF, ICBP, BRPT, BUMI, BRMS, MBMA, ARTO, DSSA, CUAN. Other names in the speaker’s list of “fried stocks” were unclear in the subtitles.
• Other instruments: Indonesian and US 10-year government bonds, rupiah, short selling and stock index funds.
• Sectors mentioned: Banks, telecommunications, mining, consumer staples and automotive.

Disclosures and cautions

• The host stated that stock discussions were for reference, consideration and education only, and were not buy or sell orders. Investors bear responsibility for their own gains and losses.
• Rahmat described his market views as opinions and cautioned that markets are not an exact science. His short-selling discussion emphasized substantial risk.
• His forecasts—including a possible stand-alone classification and index-level estimates—were his own views, not established outcomes.

Presenters and sources

• Presenter/guest: John Daniel Rahmat, introduced as a senior adviser and independent commissioner at Pinacle Investment Indonesia.
• Host: Rita (the opening introduction also appears to refer to Nita in the subtitles).
• Sources and institutions cited: MSCI, FTSE, Bloomberg, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.