History shows that human progress is a myth | John Gray, Jonny Thomson

Overview

John Gray argues that the widely held belief—still reinforced after major catastrophes like the world wars, the Russian Revolution, and China’s Cultural Revolution—that humanity is steadily progressing toward a more advanced, rational, and “civilized” future is a harmful myth.

He distinguishes between types of “progress”:

• Technological and scientific progress can genuinely accumulate over time.
• Moral and political progress is far less stable and can be reversed or “unwound” within a few generations.

As a result, Gray claims there is no reliable guarantee that societies collectively become better than they were in the past—and he goes further to say it is “not likely” that future outcomes will be improvements overall.

Why Gray is called a “pessimist”

Gray’s critics label him a pessimist because he rejects the modern premise that the present represents an ongoing ascent toward permanently higher civilization.

He argues that the myth of progress can tempt policymakers and publics into ambitious projects that worsen conditions. He cites his opposition to the Iraq War as an example: he anticipated the possibility of the state’s breakup and ensuing bloodshed, though he did not foresee all atrocities (such as ISIS and the genocide of the Yazidis).

Gray also describes his book False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism as initially dismissed as “apocalyptically pessimistic,” but he maintains that later financial and political crises—including the buildup to the 2007–08 financial crisis—validated his broader claim that delusional optimism eventually collapses.

“Inevitability”: agency without determinism

On the question of inevitability, Gray rejects both:

• the idea that progress is always possible, and
• strict historical determinism

Instead, he argues that human agency exists, but it operates within tight constraints shaped by earlier events. He illustrates this with interwar Europe, claiming that after World War I the social agreements and shared assumptions needed for incremental improvement broke down.

He also discusses thinkers such as Arthur Koestler, whom Gray credits with recognizing that slow, incremental progress was unlikely amid deep ideological and national divisions. Overall, Gray argues that in many historical periods:

• available options become severely limited, and
• the future may not be improvable even if people desire improvement.

Geography and conflict: not an “end of history,” but a contest of routes

Gray argues that conflicts are increasingly driven by “geography”—enduring constraints involving:

• chokepoints
• transit routes
• control of resources

He debates Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, suggesting that what has returned is not ideological conflictlessness, but strategic contestation over resources and routes (for example, Hormuz and Malacca).

Example: Hormuz as a long-term strategic asset

He further claims that Donald Trump’s decision-making had geopolitical consequences: by initiating or triggering war in Iran, Trump enabled Iran to gain or secure control over the Strait of Hormuz. Gray compares this to a strategic weapon—one that will not easily be relinquished.

In Gray’s view, even when agency matters, certain actions can “close options” permanently, making the future worse even if it was not predetermined.

Conclusion: realism about constraints, not nihilism

Gray emphasizes that his aim is not political withdrawal or nihilism. Instead, he wants to illuminate what he sees as enduring features of the human condition, while leaving room for individuals or groups to choose how to act—through:

• political projects meant to mitigate suffering, or
• alternative life commitments.

He also argues that modern Western progress narratives are a secularized version of older religious assumptions about meaningful history. Even though Gray is an atheist, he claims that Christian humility about what humans can know is, in his view, more realistic.

The “good,” meaning-making, and the danger of stories

Gray ties the plausibility of progress to deeper assumptions about what counts as “the good.” He argues that humans seek meaning, not just survival, and that societal narratives—needed for social cohesion—are both indispensable and dangerous.

These stories can:

• elevate a society’s identity and justification,
• make alternative narratives intolerable, and
• encourage violence when stories clash.

Hobbes and political legitimacy: survival, covenant, and resistance

Gray connects his ideas to Hobbes:

• For Hobbes, political legitimacy rests on protecting people from violent death.
• Social orders require shared, covenant-like beliefs—not purely legal arrangements.

Gray suggests that if a sovereign threatens basic survival, individuals may have a moral right to resist or evade. He cites examples such as oppression under Nazi Germany or the former Soviet Union, and relates this to modern pressures like conscription.

Presenters / contributors

• John Gray
• Jonny Thomson (interviewer/moderator)