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Таке право США надали лиш двом країнам у світі. Кожна ракета коштує мільйони | Михайло Люксіков

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News and Commentary

Overview (Radio NV Episode: “Radio NV”)

The episode opens with a discussion question about whether Donald Trump could pressure Russia to end the war. It then shifts into a military-technical briefing by Mikhail Lyuksikov (editor-in-chief of a military portal), covering:

  • G7 missile support prospects
  • New Ukrainian defense products
  • Russian strike and air-defense performance claims

1) G7 Plan to Enable Ukraine to Produce Anti-Ballistic Missiles

Lyuksikov discusses a G7 joint statement indicating that working groups will explore granting Ukraine a license to produce anti-ballistic (interceptor) missiles.

Likely missile context

  • The discussion suggests the likely reference is to Patriot-system interceptors.
  • He points to potential supply chains and production involvement in:
    • United States
    • Japan
    • potentially Germany

Timeline realism (Germany)

  • He estimates roughly five years from agreement/contracting to production start in Germany.
  • However, he emphasizes that technical feasibility alone isn’t enough:
    • commercial orders/commitments and
    • political decisions

affect how quickly factories can be launched.

2) Eurosatory 2026: What Ukrainian Manufacturers Presented

Lyuksikov argues that Ukrainian defense industry representation at Eurosatory 2026 appears significantly larger than the previous year. He highlights several systems shown or featured.

UAV290 strike drone (Ukroboronprom)

Reported specs (from subtitles) include:

  • up to 800 km/h
  • 100 kg warhead
  • 650 km range

Lyuksikov connects this to a broader trend:

  • Russia is expected to increasingly use “reactive” versions of Shahed-style drones later this year or by fall.
  • He argues Ukraine is also shifting toward this “jet/reaction” direction, noting Ukraine has already used systems like:
    • Palyanytsia (“jet drones”)
    • other related products
  • He assumes Russia adapts its drone mix based on effectiveness analysis of what Ukraine has been using.

“Eternal battle” framing: interceptors vs. faster drones

Lyuksikov says:

  • Even with jet versions, Russian jet drones are already being intercepted by Ukrainian interceptor concepts.

Russia’s counter-approach is described as iterative speed improvement:

  • Geranium 3 → Geranium 4 → Geranium 5
  • The goal: reduce the time window for interceptors to catch and neutralize the drone.

“Dragon launcher” with air-to-air missiles

A new launcher concept is described as carrying:

  • three air-to-air missiles (e.g., R60, R73, AIM-9M variants)

Purpose:

  • engage high-speed targets, including
    • jet-aircraft-class threats
    • cruise missiles

Lyuksikov frames it as part of a broader “Franken” adaptation approach:

  • repurposing/combining existing missile technologies into a new launcher concept.

He distinguishes this from the best-known “Franken” example:

  • instead of the Buk system repurposed to fire American missiles,
  • he claims this concept is “simpler” in integration and leans on guidance/seekers (e.g., thermal homing) plus platform integration based on domestic development.

He also notes additional ongoing domestic missile efforts (including a domestic S-100 concept) and integration of other munitions (unnamed).

“Sea Trident” underwater drone/platform

Presented as a large underwater unmanned platform with payload capacity up to ~1000 kg.

Lyuksikov suggests its role fits global operational niches for:

  • autonomous or remotely operated underwater platforms

He mentions parallels to missions such as:

  • mining
  • cargo delivery
  • multi-purpose maritime tasks

He characterizes the manufacturer’s positioning as “multi-purpose,” implying final roles depend on operator tasking.

3) “Flip Side” Discussion: Moscow Refinery Attack and Air-Defense Questions

The episode references an attack on the Moscow oil refinery in Kapotnya, near the Kremlin.

Lyuksikov focuses on why Russian air defenses allegedly failed to stop drones/munitions, noting that beyond the refinery, the broader Moscow region includes many:

  • defense-related enterprises and
  • research/design organizations.

He offers two non-exclusive explanations:

  1. Exhaustion/depletion of air-defense ammunition due to prior massive strikes—requiring time to replenish.
  2. Strike planning optimization, including routing/approach differences and execution factors that enabled penetration.

4) Claim About “Live Route Changes” for Drones (Ukrainian Online Control)

The discussion is skeptical about claims that unique intelligence enables near-real-time rerouting of Ukrainian drones during flight.

Lyuksikov’s position:

  • This is more plausible over temporarily occupied territory, where communications can potentially be maintained.
  • Over Russia, it becomes much more difficult.

He also counters “online control” explanations using observed Russian post-strike behavior:

  • past events included mobile internet degradation/restrictions
  • this suggests Russian claims may be used as a justification/excuse for air-defense shortcomings.

Overall, he treats “wunderwaffe online control” explanations as likely exaggerated without strong open-source proof (e.g., video showing real-time control).

5) Analytical Claims: Alleged Russian Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Guidance Defect

The episode ends with analysis attributed to Dallas Analytics:

  • A medium-range ballistic missile is claimed to have a defective guidance system
  • Potential impact: deviations by tens of kilometers
  • The analysis references a Soviet-era GU503 gyroscope unit, arguing it can no longer be properly adjusted/calibrated in Russia

Lyuksikov explains the general principle:

  • gyroscopes are central to inertial guidance and orientation
  • if uncalibrated or faulty, accuracy can degrade substantially

He cautions it’s hard to determine:

  • when the defect originated or
  • how feasible the scenario is

based solely on the presence of the gyroscope technology. He also notes that if a “70s” origin were truly key, Russia might attempt replacement or modernization.

Presenters / Contributors

  • Pavel Novikov — host, Radio NV
  • Mikhail Lyuksikov — editor-in-chief, military portal; guest expert

Original video