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AUKUS: The latest and loudest warnings the deal is already collapsing

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News and Commentary

Episode framing: two connected developments

The episode is framed as commentary on two developments:

  1. Speeches and messaging at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore
  2. Signs that Australia’s AUKUS submarine roadmap is already slipping

Shangri-La Dialogue: messaging downshifts and “rules vs power” framing

Diplomatic “theater” vs substance

  • Sam Roggeveen and Hugh White argue that while Shangri-La features major set-piece speeches, much meaningful diplomacy happens in smaller bilateral meetings.
  • They also suggest speeches can be performative, sometimes deliberately reframing remarks in response to others.

US strategy rhetoric softened toward China

  • The hosts focus on US Secretary of Defense Pete Hoekstra’s speech for not emphasizing Taiwan and the South China Sea directly.
  • Instead, the language includes:
    • “risk of hegemony”
    • a role of balancing rather than leading

Implicit concession about US decline

  • White reads Hoekstra’s position (“we’re not going to be the hegemon, either; you can’t dominate either”) as acceptance that US unchallenged primacy is no longer the baseline.

“Strong, quiet, and clear” as revealing personality-politics

  • The hosts criticize the speech’s recurring mantra, arguing it is oddly self-advertising for a defense secretary and reflects the administration’s posture.

Omission of Iran noted

  • They call it striking that Hoekstra reportedly did not mention Iran, given the geopolitical moment.

Melancholy about rules-based order (Richard Marles)

  • A key theme is that Australian remarks convey a sense that the era of the rules-based order—once buoyed by US investment—may be ending.

Critique of “rules-based order vs power-based order”

  • The hosts argue that framing the debate as “rules vs power” is misleading rhetoric.
  • They claim rules always interact with power, and that “rules-based order” can function partly as a way to argue US primacy, since other powers behave like great powers too.

AUKUS: two major updates interpreted as “the optimum pathway” slipping

The hosts argue that in the past few days, two announcements represent the first meaningful admissions that AUKUS is not following the “optimum pathway” promised in 2023.

1) Collins submarine life extension scaled back (LOTE reduced)

  • Life of Type Extension (LOTE) shortened/reduced: They argue the government’s announcement means the Collins mid-life upgrades and extension work will be “substantially scaled back,” leaving submarines with more old components.

  • Operational consequences: This is said to imply:

    • more maintenance
    • more frequent breakdowns
    • significant cost and disruption

    • Training and personnel risk: This is presented as an operational threat because Australia needs enough submarines in service to:

    • maintain a submarine capability, and

    • provide training throughput to produce enough sailors to operate incoming US nuclear submarines.
    • Political critique of government handling: They imply Labor shares responsibility for delays and disruption, while acknowledging the extension has been troublesome “for decades.”

2) Swap from “two used + one new Virginia” to “three new used Virginia”

  • Fleet simplification rationale: Richard Marles is said to argue it’s better to have one Virginia design lineage (built in blocks), making operation and training easier.

  • Another symptom, not a fix (White and Roggeveen): The hosts characterize the shift as part of AUKUS’s practical unraveling—especially given their earlier criticism that operating multiple submarine types/classes is already hard for Australia.

  • Likely US production constraints: They speculate the change is driven by US shipyard output shortfalls (Virginia production reportedly around ~1 boat/year rather than the earlier target of 2+ by mid-decade), implying Australia is being offered older boats rather than new ones.

  • Hard transfer approval problem remains: Even with the revised Virginia plan, the US president must still judge that transfers won’t degrade US operational capability, presented as a persistent barrier.

Politics and “atmospherics”: doubts becoming speakable

  • From “too big to fail” to open concern: The hosts contrast government messaging of confidence with signs that conservative figures and coalition voices are beginning to publicly question whether AUKUS is on track.

  • Mark Carney influence alleged: White suggests the tone in Marles’s remarks resembles Carney/Davos rhetoric about the end of the rules-based order, and they dispute that framing.

  • AUKUS failure scenario discussed via B-21 idea: They reference Senator James Patterson floating the possibility of B-21 bombers as an alternative if AUKUS fails—interpreted as an acknowledgement that collapse is at least conceivable.

  • They reject bomber substitution (but note the implication): While doubting the technical/strategic logic, they agree Patterson’s comments are politically significant: they show uncertainty is becoming acceptable to discuss.

What should replace AUKUS if submarine capability is lost?

  • Shift from “platform” to “task”: The hosts argue it’s too late to treat submarine failure as unlikely; Australia should plan alternate ways to accomplish submarine missions.

  • Denial of maritime/air approaches (as the core idea): Their core view is that submarines matter primarily for:

    • detecting and attacking adversary shipping, and
    • denying approach to forces heading toward Australia.
    • Cheaper ways to extend anti-shipping reach: They suggest expanding land-based air power using longer-range aircraft/missiles, air-to-air refueling, and other cost-effective means—arguing that within Australia’s land-based air range, missiles from aircraft are typically cheaper and more effective than relying on submarines.

  • Submarines as “transportation devices”: They conclude submarines ultimately transport sensors and weapons closer to targets; therefore, other transport/attack approaches could substitute if required.

Presenters / contributors

  • Sam Roggeveen (Lowy Institute)
  • Hugh White (Australian National University)

Original video