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Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee | 19/06/2026

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Summary of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee hearing (19/06/2026) on the MRH90 Taipan helicopter incident (28 July 2023)

The hearing focused on the MRH90 “Taipan” accident that killed Captain Daniel Lion, Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent, Warrant Officer Class 2 Joseph Philip Lac, and Corporal Alexander Nags. It combined:

  1. testimony on aviation testing and airworthiness processes,
  2. the Commonwealth’s criminal prosecution status for Work Health and Safety (WHS) offences referred by Comcare, and Comcare’s investigation approach,
  3. Defence/DFSB accident findings and safety recommendations, and
  4. family testimony describing perceived systemic failures and ongoing harms.

1) Opening framing and procedure

  • The committee opened by acknowledging the victims and reminding witnesses about parliamentary privilege, contempt rules, and options for in-camera evidence.
  • Proceedings included multiple witness panels:
    • retired test pilots / test leadership,
    • prosecution and regulatory bodies (CDP/Comcare),
    • Defence/DFSB, and
    • then family members of victims.

2) Testimony by retired Army test leadership (Major Ian Wilson; Major David Lamb)

Key technical and procedural claims

  • They argued the risk was known in testing and airworthiness oversight, and that later processes allowed the helicopter to be used beyond meaningful safety controls for the operational role.
  • They emphasized that for “Plan Palisade” (integrating MRH90 into the special operations role), there was an approach involving a technical pathway that differed from “normal” rigour—described as “highly unusual”, including advice or steps outside the usual flight test organization model.

HMSD / “Top Owl” findings

  • They said testing identified that pitch/attitude symbology could be reversed when off-axis (looking left/right), creating a severe risk of spatial disorientation.
  • They argued that in accident-like conditions (low horizon, storm cell, water plus low cloud/rain at night), pilots would become disoriented and could experience controlled flight into terrain.
  • They disputed later conclusions by Defence investigators, saying the later analysis minimized or discounted hazards they described as central.

Flight test “stop testing” rationale

  • When challenged about terminating testing, they stated this reflected safe flight-test practice: once the aircraft/system stopped performing consistently with established knowledge, continuing testing would not properly enable risk mitigation.

Broader governance / culture allegations

  • They alleged the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) process was compromised by conflicts of interest and/or flawed handling of evidence (described as a “fruit from the poison tree” argument).
  • They claimed senior Army leadership could “paper over” unpalatable technical advice and did not fully respect delegated airworthiness governance.
  • They described fear of retribution after earlier IGADF proceedings and allegations of a smear campaign.

3) Criminal prosecution and limitation issues (CDP: Director of Public Prosecutions—Commonwealth; Comcare)

(a) Commonwealth DPP (Rachael Sharpe Case; Andrew Doyle)

  • CDP confirmed it received Comcare referrals/briefs of evidence and did not commence prosecution (described as decisions around mid-2025 / July 2025) due to no reasonable prospects of conviction.
  • CDP stressed it must balance public interest with the integrity of any further investigation/prosecution, citing concerns that further disclosure could prejudice ongoing matters.
  • It described the procedural framework for reopening/considering new evidence:
    • a key issue is WHS Act limitation periods,
    • where relevant “official inquiry” outcomes (e.g., IGADF or a coroner) occur, limitation windows may extend (as framed in submissions/evidence).

(b) Comcare (Colin Radford; Justin Napier; Luis Close; Michael Duke)

  • Comcare described its WHS compliance investigation (fatigue risks; “Top Owl” risks; potential aircraft/structural issues).
  • Comcare said it formed the view that Defence failed to implement controls so far as reasonably practicable, and referred two briefs of evidence to CDP:
    • fatigue management, and
    • Top Owl.
  • Comcare stated prosecution did not proceed due to CDP’s reasonable prospects assessment.
  • It maintained its investigation remained open and discussed how limitation periods might be extended by:
    • IGADF outcomes and potentially Queensland coroner processes,
    • potentially providing an additional 12 months to refer a further brief (subject to legal interpretation and timing).

Independence / expert review questions

  • Senators asked whether Comcare obtained independent expert advice outside the Army.
  • Comcare said it would provide some details on notice due to the risk of prejudicing future prosecution.

Pattern vs single incident

  • Comcare said its primary triggers are notifiable incidents, though it can examine patterns if evidence emerges.
  • It did not provide a detailed number of MRH90 incidents in the public evidence (some matters were taken on notice).

4) Defence and DFSB: accident causation and process defence (Air Vice Marshal Tim Innis; Major General David Hafner; Group Captain David Smith)

DFSB conclusion

  • Defence accepted the DFSB report’s conclusion that the accident was caused by unrecognized loss of spatial orientation.
  • Defence stated the May 2025 report was completed and that Defence accepted 46 recommendations, with 19 completed at the time of testimony.
  • Defence emphasized DFSB is independent and used a peer-reviewed investigation process designed for objectivity.

Dispute points raised by the committee

  • Families and earlier witnesses alleged conflicts of interest and that certain decisions “downgraded” hazards (e.g., from unacceptable to undesirable).
  • Defence/DFSB witnesses:
    • denied that key individuals played an analysis role in the DFSB investigation,
    • asserted “known hazards” related to HMSD/Top Owl were very unlikely to contribute to loss of spatial orientation in the accident sequence,
    • argued earlier test findings were incorporated into training/procedures and bounded operational use.

Opposing interpretation of HMSD / Top Owl relevance

  • Senators repeatedly asked why DFSB did not treat the symbology hazard as contributory, given witnesses’ claims of near-predictive risk.
  • DFSB maintained that, in the accident sequence, hazards were not causally linked in the way alleged, and provided technical explanations about:
    • attention/scanning behaviour during formation flight,
    • why pitch scale symbology was likely not referenced at the critical moment,
    • and how mental-model recalibration occurs over seconds, consistent with spatial disorientation research.

Reliance on operational evaluation

  • Defence defended the operational evaluation / test and evaluation pathway used for software/version changes.
  • It argued certification and airworthiness are multi-stage, including:
    • engineering certification by DASA/authority,
    • test and evaluation by flight test organizations,
    • operational assessments/training,
    • and then authorization/limits/risk governance.

5) Family testimony: perceived systemic failures, accountability demands, and ongoing impacts

Family members gave emotional testimony arguing the accident was avoidable due to:

  • unsuitable/unterminated risk in the MRH90 platform for the intended operational conditions,
  • alleged suppression/workarounds of safety warnings,
  • fatigue management and equipment readiness concerns, and
  • perceived failures to provide transparency, dignity, and timely information across investigations and support systems.

Common themes

  • Accountability and admissions: multiple family members demanded Defence “admit something went wrong” rather than relying on “word salad” or evasions.
  • Systemic culture: repeated claims of “risk normalization,” prioritizing career progression and mission continuity over safety.
  • Support and service aftermath:
    • difficulties accessing support and clear decision pathways (acute supports, counseling funding, bereavement and housing extensions, education and relocations),
    • complex and sometimes inconsistent communication with families,
    • perceived shortcomings in decision-making autonomy and delays related to support packages.
  • War memorial recognition and commemoration: families raised concerns about recognition for service/training deaths and requested follow-up on plaques/honour roll placement for these victims.
  • Reputation and trust: families said the process compounded grief and undermined confidence in Defence institutions.

Overall through-line / “main arguments” presented to the committee

  1. Families and test witnesses argued the accident reflected known hazards and institutional decisions that bypassed or weakened safety controls—especially around HMSD/Top Owl behavior under off-axis viewing in low-visibility conditions—and that later investigations did not adequately address this causation.
  2. CDP and Comcare stated WHS prosecution was not pursued due to the legal threshold (reasonable prospects of conviction), while emphasizing limitation-period rules and the possibility of revisiting decisions if IGADF/coroner findings extend time windows.
  3. Defence/DFSB argued the causal finding was unrecognized spatial disorientation; that hazards were bounded via procedures and training; that DFSB’s investigation was independent and peer-reviewed; and that their technical analysis found the Top Owl symbology hazards were not contributory in the specific accident sequence.

Presenters / contributors (as listed by role in subtitles)

Senators / Committee

  • Senator Shoe Brbridge
  • Senator Roberts
  • Senator Shubbridge (spelled variably in subtitles)
  • Senator Cadel
  • Senator Kadell (may be the same as Cadel in subtitles; spelling appears inconsistent)
  • Senator Railen Sharp (appears to be the CDP witness; however “Senator” prefix appears in subtitles—treated as witness for accuracy below)
  • Senator Schubbridge (appears as Shubbridge/Shubbridge variants)

Witnesses (retired test pilots / Army Aviation)

  • Retired Major Ian Wilson (former MRH90 test pilot; also referenced as H90 test pilot in subtitles)
  • Retired Major David Lamb (executive officer of Army Aviation Test and Evaluation; MRH90 test pilot/supervisor in subtitles)

Commonwealth prosecuting authority

  • Rachael Sharp (Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth)
  • Andrew Doyle (acting national practice leader for fraud and specialist agencies at CDP)

Comcare / WHS regulator

  • Colin Radford (CEO and accountable authority, Comcare)
  • Justin Napier (General Manager, Regulatory Operations Group, Comcare)
  • Luis Close (General Manager, Comcare’s Legal Group)
  • Michael Duke (Deputy CEO, Comcare)

Defence / Aviation safety investigation

  • Air Vice Marshal Tim Innis (representing Defense Aviation Authority in subtitles)
  • Major General David Hafner (commander, Army Aviation Command)
  • Group Captain David Smith (director, Defense Flight Safety Bureau; officer in charge of aviation safety investigation)

DFSB / Army officials mentioned during questioning (not always directly presenting)

  • Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Norton
  • Colonel David Lynch (Director of Operational Airworthiness)
  • Lieutenant General Stewart (answered a specific question in subtitles)
  • Major General Jobson (referenced by families/a senator in subtitles)
  • Lieutenant Colonel / Colonel Reinhardt (spelling and rank vary in subtitles: Brena Reinhardt / Colonel Reinhardt)
  • DSTG (referenced by name; no individual specified)

Families / next of kin

  • Samantha Nent (Max Nent’s sister)
  • Daniel Nent (Lieutenant Nent’s father)
  • David Nags (Nags’ father)
  • Sarah Loft (partner of Corporal Alexander Nags)
  • Caitlyn Lion (Captain Daniel Lion’s wife)
  • Jadine White (Max’s partner)
  • Matthew BiciI (Max’s best friend; support)
  • Sarah Loft (appears again in subtitles; repeated)
  • Max’s partner and others as named above (some repeated in subtitles)

Other named figures (mentioned but not presenters)

  • Inspector General of the ADF (female in subtitles; no name given)
  • Minister Rishworth
  • Minister McMurdo (referenced by a family member; counsel/involvement unclear)
  • North Bondi IRSL (named as providing support; not a presenter)

Original video