Военные расходы России растут: хватит ли денег на СВО и что будет с экономикой / УР

Summary of main arguments and analyses

• Russia’s budget shifts toward war spending, with real growth likely larger than the draft figures. The guest argues that while the draft 2026–2028 plans show military spending rising by roughly “up to 30%,” the key comparison should be actual current-year spending, which he estimates indirectly at about 15.5–17 trillion rubles (around 16T) rather than the lower “budgeted” level. He suggests that the government’s three-year planning increasingly reflects a longer war duration: earlier plans assumed military spending would rise and then sharply fall, but this time the multi-year framework appears designed to maintain high military outlays.

• Military spending tends to exceed the formal budget, implying pressure from the military lobby and limited budget “defensive lines.” He says the Ministry of Finance budgets with some constraints in mind, but real expenditures end up higher. He emphasizes focusing on real, executed spending, not only the headline numbers in the draft law.

• Financing the war remains possible through tax collection and enforcement, not through “economic collapse.” The discussion turns to revenue. The guest cites VAT revenue growth of nearly 30%, arguing this indicates tax increases are not producing a collapse into evasion. Instead, he claims collection discipline improves. He also notes that while small businesses may suffer and close, overall tax intake can still rise due to enforcement, repayment of arrears, and the dismantling of schemes.

• Proposed taxes on “luxury” foods (e.g., oysters, lobsters) are described as largely populist and marginal for revenue. He calls such measures “populism,” arguing their fiscal impact would be tiny relative to budget needs. He also suggests that changing taxation can affect small businesses, framing it as consistent with the state’s priorities.

• A political-economic rationale: low unemployment means small-business “failures” may be socially tolerated because labor needs are war-driven. He argues small businesses have lower productivity and pay less per employee than larger firms. From the state’s perspective, bankruptcy and consolidation into larger firms can increase productivity and tax bases. With “extremely low unemployment,” he says the economy faces a labor shortage, and the war requires mobilization and reallocation—so policies that reduce small-business space may be seen as “optimized” for war needs.

• Urban warfare costs are rising; both sides may face financial constraints, but not immediate collapse. Using back-of-the-envelope calculations (based on monthly production/consumption claims), he argues that if missile/drone costs form a growing share of military budgets, then financial constraints—not only factory capacity—will increasingly limit escalation. He estimates that strikes on cities and air-defense expenditures could rise from a smaller share to something like 10–20%, potentially 30–40% of military spending. He also argues that scaling drone/missile output likely won’t jump by an order of magnitude, even if volumes keep increasing.

• Sanctions relief in exchange for political prisoners is treated as unlikely to meaningfully reduce Russia’s war capacity. He disputes the idea that lifting sanctions would allow Russia to ramp up output massively. He says immediate constraints are often physical/industrial (production throughput) and that even large money transfers cannot instantly convert into vastly higher ammunition output. He also suggests major sanctions function as bargaining chips, and that any deal would likely involve symbolic or limited swaps rather than a broad economic rollback.

• Oil industry discussion: “damper” subsidies and refinery drone damage affect budget revenues, but the main point is the fiscal mechanism and market imbalance. He explains that Russia’s budget revenues can fall even when world prices for oil/gas are favorable because of high prices for refined products and the oil product “damper” mechanism (reverse payments/subsidies) that absorbs extra profits to keep domestic fuel prices low. Regarding refinery strikes, he criticizes headline framing like “half the refineries damaged,” noting there are many hits and fires, repairs continue, and production volumes likely drop (he mentions roughly 20–25%), even if plants resume operations rather than fully shutting down. He references historical bombing patterns (Nazi Germany) to note that factories often restart, while adding that very long, repeated strikes could eventually cause deeper system failures.

Presenters / contributors

• Dmitry Nekrasov — economist, Director of the Case Center
• Valentina Matviyenko — Speaker of the Federation Council (mentioned in discussion)
• Ruslan Leviv — mentioned as a past broadcast guest
• Nastya Shevchenko — mentioned as a participant in a prior broadcast
• Mikhail Khodorkovsky — mentioned (context: Shevchenko is “an ally”)
• Vladimir Putin — mentioned
• Zelensky — mentioned
• Donald Trump — mentioned
• Luis Carvalan — mentioned
• Safed (Federation Council) — referenced via Matviyenko’s role