BORIS PALMER:" Dieses Wahlergebnis ist ein Glücksfall!"

Overview: Rethinking Germany’s post-election debate

Boris Palmer argues that Germany’s post–state-election political debate is being handled in the wrong way. Instead of focusing on structural problems and realistic strategy, many observers center on “personnel debates” (who should become chancellor/minister-president) and on repeating narratives from the immediate days after the vote. He criticizes this approach as helpless and says it delays a genuine rethinking.

Rethinking after the election: away from personnel politics

Palmer claims public reactions—especially discussions around Friedrich Merz—are “helpless” because they often treat the situation as if the solution were simply:

• demanding that people stop voting for the AfD, or
• replacing the top person.

In his view, political change must address deeper causes rather than relying on leadership swaps or a charismatic “luminary.”

Complexity and the “Gordian knot” of administration

A major part of his analysis is that Germans feel trapped by increasing complexity—rules, administration, slow processes, high costs, and discouraging bureaucracy. He describes this as affecting citizens, municipalities, and companies.

He frames it as a “Gordian knot” that feels unfixable, but insists democracies can reform it because they created the rules—and can also change them.

Why people vote AfD (in his view): not fear-mongering

Palmer disputes the dominant explanation that AfD success is mainly driven by people wanting “fascism returned.” He argues this is largely a projection from non-AfD voters, and that AfD voters provide more concrete, issue-based reasons, such as:

• opposition to continued German financial support for Ukraine to buy weapons
• renewed interest in buying Russian natural gas to improve industrial competitiveness and jobs
• a sense of neglect and “bleeding out” outside major cities (e.g., healthcare/doctor shortages and rural decline), alongside the AfD promise that things will improve

He criticizes the “firewall” approach as a moralizing tactic that ostracizes AfD voters instead of engaging them in rational dialogue.

The “firewall” critique: social exclusion is counterproductive

Palmer argues that a firewall can be legitimate in coalition negotiations (parties can refuse coalitions), but becomes illegitimate and ineffective when it operates as contempt, exclusion, and social ostracism.

He cites his own experience of being accused of enabling fascists after publicly debating with the AfD. In his view, such exclusion fails—especially when it concerns a large share of the electorate—and functions like a self-defeating justification that blocks real discussion.

What the firewall is “really” for (motives)

He proposes two motives behind the firewall:

1. A historical “never again” stance treating fascism as so dangerous that it blocks further progress (which he considers politically unsuccessful).
2. Concern about far-right governance effects—especially for minorities, LGBTQ people, immigrants, and the rule of law—which he considers justified, though he argues it is often overstated as an imminent fascist return.

Is the danger fascism—or authoritarianism?

Palmer says the key risk is not “fascism coming next,” but authoritarian drift and the erosion of democratic institutions. He points to European examples where far-right governments exist without leading to the extreme outcomes some fear (he references cases like Italy/France, arguing Europe’s trajectory there was not simply “catastrophic”).

Central strategic risk: CDU/CSU fragmentation and AfD momentum

He identifies the CDU/CSU as the linchpin of the German party system. In his view, the AfD aims to fracture and discredit the moderate conservative bloc; if voters stop trusting the CDU/CSU, the AfD can expand beyond its current base.

Role of the Greens in Saxony-Anhalt

Palmer argues the Greens helped reduce the risk of an AfD absolute majority by attracting voters who might otherwise have voted tactically to prevent AfD dominance. He frames this as democratic bulwark behavior in practice.

Palmer’s “stroke of luck” claim: AfD didn’t get an AfD-only path

He calls the Saxony-Anhalt result a “stroke of luck” because it was close to an AfD absolute majority. He says that with an AfD single-party government he would have major concerns—particularly for minorities and migration policy.

Instead, he argues the AfD may be able to appoint the minister-president, but cannot govern freely.

A scenario of limited, issue-based cooperation

Palmer suggests that cooperation constraints—especially involving the BSW—could push the AfD toward “controlled sharing of responsibility.” That would mean building majorities for specific proposals rather than ruling unilaterally.

Given constitutional limits and political arithmetic, he argues the BSW’s position could prevent AfD full control and enable targeted negotiations instead of maximal confrontation.

Final advice: “govern well,” not retreat

His bottom line is that the best response for established parties is not resignation or reflexive opposition, but good governance—addressing:

• the backlog of reforms, and
• demographic/social-security problems,

rather than yielding to short-term voter backlash.

Presenters / contributors

• Boris Palmer (primary speaker)