Dick Schoof LIEGT over Hugo de Jonge en Grapperhaus die liever Abbing er niet bij wilden hebben.

Summary of the hearing (Dutch coronavirus inquiry)

In a parliamentary public hearing, former cabinet/justice leader Dick Schoof (Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice and Security during COVID-19) explains how the early COVID crisis decision-making worked, what its shortcomings were, and how the system was later reorganized. The discussion focuses on meeting structures (MCC/ICCB/MCCB/ACC), the balance between speed and broad societal consideration, and the roles of key government bodies such as the NCTV, OMT, and DG COVID.

1) Schoof’s role and early crisis approach (speed-first)

• Schoof describes his start as Secretary-General on 1 March 2020, just before major lockdown announcements, and says his initial function was mainly to ensure that the justice system could keep operating despite court closures and disruptions to immigration/judicial procedures.
• He argues that in the first phase of COVID, the government relied on a crisis decision-making “manual” framework, designed for national crises in general (not specifically for pandemics).
• According to him, the ministerial crisis committee (MCCB/mini-crisis political body) was essential because it enabled very fast decisions using a small, focused decision group. Informal/short meetings (including Tower sessions and Catshuis reflections) served specific purposes:
  • Tower consultations: keep communication lines short among key players and civil servants.
  • Catshuis sessions: reflection and thematic discussion for the longer-term direction.

2) Disadvantages: limited information and insufficient societal weighing

Schoof acknowledges weaknesses of the early crisis model:

• decisions had to be made with limited information,
• risk of tunnel vision and insufficient support or breadth across the Council of Ministers,
• societal consequences (mental health, economy, broader social effects) were not addressed enough during the high-tempo crisis cycle.

He explicitly refers to an email dated 28 May 2020 from the Secretary-General of General Affairs (Huids/Huijs), stating that the weakness lies in the limited group and short timeframe, which can mean relevant aspects are insufficiently considered.

Schoof says that after the first wave, government recognized a tipping point: the speed advantage no longer outweighed the long-run disadvantages. This required a shift away from the pure crisis mechanism.

3) “From Sprint to Marathon”: reorganizing decision-making for longer-term COVID

• Schoof links the transition to April 2020 (when the first wave came under control), and describes efforts in April–May to restructure COVID governance.
• The reform included building a more durable decision structure with broader societal-economic focus, described as moving from short emergency “sprint” to longer “marathon.”
• He discusses the DG COVID concept and related advisory mechanisms, emphasizing the importance of calm, reflection, and workload management:
  • civil servants and political leadership faced extreme fatigue and workload,
  • crisis pressure could undermine optimal decision-making and accountability,
  • the “calm” goal was partly about preventing burnout and improving deliberation.

4) The Civil Service COVID-19 advisory committee (ACC) as a “gateway”

Another contributor (Mutler) questions Schoof’s system design: after summer 2020, top civil servants across departments met in the ACC (civil service advisory committee).

Schoof explains:

• The ACC served as an official civil service “gateway/vestibule” feeding advice into the ministerial committee structure.
• It included Secretaries-General, planning agencies, safety regions, and often representatives such as DG COVID and VWS leadership; sometimes even the OMT.
• He says it was largely effective:
  • they met frequently (he believes 100+ times),
  • they provided advice on concrete measures (e.g., entry passes, curfew, lockdown),
  • and maintained the professional advisory role even if political direction was influenced by prior Catshuis discussions.

He adds that the committee’s success depended on ensuring it received timely input from stakeholders and had access to medical and policy expertise—allowing it to respond to short-turnaround needs.

5) Coordination bodies: NCTV withdrawal/return and the DG COVID “interdepartmental club”

A further panelist (Dermatologist—likely an OCR/subtitle error) asks about the NCTV withdrawing from the crisis organization in summer 2020 and later returning when virus spread required short-term measures again.

Schoof explains:

• NCTV supports the crisis decision architecture (MCC/ICCB), so it logically stepped out when the structure shifted toward longer-term governance.
• Once the virus resurged and showed the long-term organization couldn’t handle short-term decision needs adequately, NCTV was brought back to coordinate the short-term response.

He emphasizes that DG COVID’s institutional design is central:

• it was deliberately set up as an interdepartmental, club-like civil service structure rather than a directorate owned by a single minister,
• ministers acted as “sponsors” for specific topics so DG COVID’s cross-cutting work still had political access where needed.

Schoof argues that placing DG COVID under one minister would have created a political system mismatch and unfairness; the interdepartmental model was intended to reflect the cross-domain nature of COVID impacts (society, economy, youth/elderly, etc.).

6) Tensions and criticisms (including around ministerial support and “not complicit”)

The hearing references internal documentary disputes, including:

• concerns about maintaining “calm” and decision stability,
• friction over DG COVID’s role and political sponsorship,
• statements attributed to ministers (e.g., resistance to DG COVID becoming a “third player” alongside VWS and NCTV).

Schoof responds:

• DG COVID’s interdepartmental authority and meeting access enabled it to contribute across the full spectrum.
• political disagreements reflected tensions between short-term health crisis handling and longer-term societal governance, but the system still produced advice enabling decisions to be made.

7) Overall verdict offered by Schoof

Schoof’s overarching message is that the government continuously adapted governance structures as the crisis evolved:

• initial focus on rapid national crisis decision-making,
• later shift to longer-term, society-wide consequences assessment (“sprint to marathon”),
• and a practical split where NCTV handled short-term measures while DG COVID supported medium/long-term planning.

He emphasizes that although friction and boundary disputes occurred, they were not framed as competition (“who wins”), but as efforts to find the best way to manage an unprecedented crisis.

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Presenters / contributors

• Dick Schoof (witness; Secretary-General, Ministry of Justice and Security during COVID-19)
• Chairman (parliamentary hearing chair; name not captured clearly in subtitles)
• Colleague Huidkoper (interrogator)
• Colleague Mutler (interrogator)
• Colleague Dermatologist (interrogator; name not clearly captured due to subtitle errors)