Menguak Alasan Mengapa G30S Bisa Terjadi?!

Overview

The video explains why the G30S (30 September Movement) could occur in Indonesia, arguing it was not a single-cause event. Instead, it resulted from cumulative pressures stemming from domestic instability and international Cold War dynamics. It also highlights that the label “G30S” is presented more neutrally than “G30S/PKI,” and notes that different narratives emerged after the New Order regime took power.

1) Framing the G30S as a “mysterious” and contested event

• The presenter notes that Indonesian society remembers the G30S as both major and mysterious, with many competing versions.
• A key point concerns historical terminology:
  • New Order authorities used “G30S PKI” to assign blame.
  • This episode uses the more neutral label “G30S,” without directly presenting PKI as the presumed mastermind.

2) Domestic conditions before G30S: instability, failed economic policy, and eroding support

During the Old Order under Sukarno, Indonesia is described as aggressive and anti-West, particularly toward nations seen as linked to former colonizers. The video connects this stance to insecurity and the difficulty of building a new state.

It further links domestic unrest to:

• unrest and rebellions, some allegedly supported by foreign powers.

The video also portrays the economic policy as inefficient and inexperienced, worsened by:

• heavy reliance on foreign companies/know-how without effective knowledge transfer to locals,
• rapid “rush” development projects that failed to create sustainable growth.

Consequences highlighted include extreme inflation—claimed to reach 650%—which the video depicts as causing widespread hardship (referencing Mahfud MD and images of people surviving on very basic foods). The presenter argues that this economic misery contributed to:

• declining public support for Sukarno and communist-aligned forces,
• weakening the legitimacy of major political moves.

3) Cold War context: Indonesia’s balancing between US and Soviet influence

The video describes Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy as an attempt to benefit from rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It claims that in early independence struggles:

• Indonesia leveraged US pressure on the Netherlands to support independence and help secure West Irian.
• When US support became harder to obtain, Indonesia sought military and strategic backing from the Eastern Bloc / Soviet Union.

It also argues the US aimed to prevent Indonesia from falling under communist influence, including by:

• pressuring the Dutch over West Irian,
• pressuring Australia regarding its plans for West Irian,
• concern that Indonesian communist strengthening would affect larger US interests in Asia (especially related to Vietnam).

4) Military friction and weak implementation of Sukarno’s confrontational policies

A central argument is that internal military divisions weakened readiness and cohesion.

The video describes:

• When Sukarno ordered the Army to “crush Malaysia,” some generals allegedly resisted or carried out the order half-heartedly.
• Lieutenant Ahmad Yani is described as believing the army was not capable of fighting a British-backed federation.
• Nasution is portrayed as agreeing with the goal while worrying the Malaysia issue could be exploited by the PKI to strengthen its political position.

This creates a dilemma for the army: the military feared both:

• defeating the British, and
• provoking Sukarno’s retaliation if they refused.

The video also points to:

• a failed guerrilla effort in Malaysia,
• claims that PKI-backed operations helped the “crush” movement—sparking resentment and suspicion within the military.

5) PKI’s strengthening and the “fifth force” concept increasing suspicion

The episode argues that external communist support accelerated PKI influence, including:

• an early-1965 pledge of 100,000 free Chung-type weapons from China to support Indonesia, said to be associated with PKI suggestions.

It highlights Sukarno’s proposal of creating a “fifth force” outside ABRI (the Armed Forces), framed as a way to counter internal army factions. The presenter claims this:

• was opposed by army officials,
• deepened conflict between the military and the PKI.

The video also mentions a supposed Jakarta–Beijing–Moscow axis (described as aligned/endorsed by Sukarno), suggesting Sukarno used PKI power while Indonesia’s international position was deteriorating (including references to Indonesia withdrawing from the UN).

6) Conclusion: rising suspicion that “eventually exploded”

Overall, the video concludes that by the time of G30S, conditions had built to the point where:

• military–PKI competition and mistrust intensified, ultimately “exploding” during the peak G30S period.

It ends with a speculative question: if abducted generals during the G30S had been successfully rescued, would Sukarno (or his system) have remained in power? The framing encourages critical thinking without giving a definitive answer.

Presenters / Contributors

• Mimin (host/presenter)
• Professor Mahfud MD (referenced)