TierList : On classe les Meilleures Actions pour 2026 (En live avec Paul)

Purpose & setup

• Hosts run a “tier list” ranking stocks they consider undervalued vs overvalued, based mainly on:
  • Business quality/predictability
  • Valuation

• They emphasize that market sell-offs can create opportunity, but only if:

  • the valuation
  • the investment thesis
  • and a credible catalyst / re-rating path are sensible.

• They also discuss collaboration/mentoring context and their portfolio “style” (e.g., small/mid-size, concentrated ideas).

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Tier-list methodology (explicit framework)

Hosts use a letter-grid tied to valuation and quality/predictability:

• S / “masterclass” (S-shaped boxes):
  • Exceptional combination of business quality and valuation
• A-frame boxes (“not bad”):
  • Good businesses, but valuation is often less compelling and/or the thesis isn’t perfect
• B boxes (“both/adequate”):
  • Neither exceptional on quality nor valuation
• C boxes:
  • Poor fit—valuation and/or predictability not attractive
• D boxes:
  • “Almost never fits”—very poor valuation and/or predictability near zero
  • Unlikely to align with their purchase philosophy

Recurring rules

• Don’t rely only on headline growth/decline; adjust for:
  • organic vs FX vs acquisitions
  • channel/session effects
  • China exposure
• Use a “reverse DCF” / perpetuity logic to infer what growth/returns the market is pricing
• Catalyst matters:
  • A stock can be “cheap” and still not re-rate quickly without a credible trigger
• Risk management via sizing & competence:
  • Larger positions only when there is high conviction and the business is understandable
  • Diversification by low correlation is encouraged, but simply adding many holdings doesn’t necessarily reduce risk if you don’t understand them

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Key macro / market context mentioned

• They note a narrative shift: capital rotating toward more defensive/resilient sectors as other areas become extremely bullish.
• They repeatedly reference uncertainty and risk factors, including:
  • recession risk
  • tariffs
  • rates/liquidity effects (implicitly through US rates and valuation compression)
• Alcohol & obesity drugs discussion:
  • GLP-1 is framed as a demand-shift risk for alcohol consumption (“people no longer want to drink”)
  • They counter that Pernod Ricard’s margin structure and integration/distribution can partially offset volume declines

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Tier-list content: main stocks discussed

1) Pernod Ricard (PA)

Why it fell / what the hosts think is priced in

• The market reaction is described as severe:
  • “price divided by 3”
  • bought at €85, now around €69
  • cited “floor” around €58
• Decline references include:
  • ~ -14% H1 2026 and earlier -14%-type declines
• They argue published results look worse than the underlying business due to:
  • mix
  • FX
  • acquisition/session/channel effects
• Underlying performance is described as closer to ~ -4% organic vs headline ~ -15% after decomposition.
• Debt/leverage is presented as a major valuation pressure:
  • Market cap ~€18B
  • Debt ~€10B
  • “Buying the business means buying the debt”
• They discuss leverage rising, including:
  • Net debt/EBITDA ~2.5 → ~3.3 (end of 2024 to “today”)

Thesis components / valuation logic

• Core quality/predictability thesis:
  • Alcohol demand is described as durable / “un-killable”
  • Long-lived brand/distribution moats
• Growth/margins & guidance:
  • Reaffirmation for 2027–2029: ~+3% to +6% organic
  • Operating margin expansion tied to an efficiency program ~€1B
  • Debt reduction plan highlighted

Reverse DCF / what the market is pricing

• Reverse DCF assumptions cited:
  • discount rate / WACC-like input around ~9%
  • implied nominal perpetual growth ~2.1%
• Conclusion:
  • at ~€69, the market behaves like the business will grow only near inflation / near stagnation (“survival valuation”)
• Multiple framing:
  • implied valuation roughly tied to ~14x a cash-flow measure (linked conceptually to “DCF-to-multiple conversion”)
• “Thesis-killer” scenario:
  • continued/severe long-term alcohol demand decline and/or failure to execute on margins/debt reduction

Specific cautions

• No clear near-term catalyst:
  • “No reason the market wakes up” if nothing positive changes
• Structural risks:
  • GLP-1 narrative depressing sector sentiment
  • geopolitical + competitive + U.S. market share/sanctions narrative
  • China weakness referenced (improving sequentially but still down vs prior)

Portfolio/risk view

• Treated as sized risk, not an “all-in correctness bet”:
  • about ~5% of portfolio in Pernod Ricard
  • discussion of overweight/underweight across other names

Recommendation/disposition

• Tier stance: positioned comparatively well.
• Exact letter placement is not perfectly clear in the transcript, but it’s treated as superior to the lower-quality B/C/D candidates they reject.

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2) Novo Nordisk (referred to as “Nova Nordisk/Novordisk”)

Why it’s a “collapsed” valuation case

• Valuation is argued to still be too expensive for the uncertainty:
  • references to ~40x profits
  • also mentions prior peaks and being down ~70% from a peak
• Main risk driver:
  • competition / duopoly dynamics
  • especially the described Lilly acquiring 100% of shares of walk (as presented in the discussion)
• Pipeline trial uncertainty:
  • outcomes described as sensitive to “panel of people” / study selection
  • they argue even a small efficacy miss (e.g., ~1% less weight loss vs competitors) can drive major valuation compression

Conclusions

• Not framed as a “bad company” issue, but:
  • predictability + market structure + valuation
• They acknowledge “two companies will exist,” but question:
  • how much share/profitability each earns
  • therefore what returns investors should expect
• They explicitly warn about real capital loss risk:
  • “complete loss of capital over 5–10 years” in extreme scenarios

Tier stance

• Opposite to Pernod Ricard:
  • quality exists, but valuation + predictability combination is worse
• Discussed in an B/A debate, with more skepticism than Pernod Ricard.

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3) Nike (NKE)

Tier logic

• Nike is framed as mature/cyclical and “hyper mature.”
• Valuation context:
  • previously around ~40x earnings
  • multiple normalization discussed, with a warning that reassessment can still drive downside
• Strategy model risks:
  • balance between DTC vs wholesale
  • fear that wholesale discounting can harm DTC margins
• Thesis dependency:
  • how long margins/brand momentum can stabilize amid competition and fashion commoditization
• They prefer not to “lie around” in mature businesses with soft/zero growth unless valuation is very compelling

Tier stance

• Positioned around B (with discussion it could be A under some scenarios).
• Overall treated as inferior to their higher-conviction “boxes.”

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Other tickers/companies mentioned (less detailed)

Additional names/mentions include:

• ASML, Meta, Adobe, Netflix, TSMC (described as expensive and cyclical), Palantir
• Possible/unclear mentions due to transcript noise:
  • “Marriott?” (possibly MTA, unclear)
  • unclear items like ATVI/CR (not clearly identified)
  • KPG (Kell Partner Group) appears likely
  • Parex (Parex deal values mentioned)
• LVMH referenced indirectly (spirits context)
• Mentions tied to shareholder/family context around Pernod Ricard (transcript unclear on some wording)

They also reference S&P 500 as a benchmark.

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Explicit numbers & performance metrics called out

Pernod Ricard (PA)

• €85 buy → ~€69 current → “floor” ~€58
• H1 2026 headline decline cited around -14%
  • underlying described closer to ~ -4% organic
• Balance sheet / valuation:
  • Market cap ~€18B
  • Debt ~€10B
  • Net debt/EBITDA ~2.5 → ~3.3
  • Free cash flow ~€1.1–1.2 (units unclear)
  • “cash conversion rate ~80%”
• Guidance:
  • 2027–2029 organic +3% to +6%
  • efficiency program ~€1B

Novo Nordisk

• Valuation described as ~40x profits
• “Down ~70%” from peak (as stated)
• Sensitivity example:
  • ~1% efficacy delta discussed as impactful to outcomes/market valuation

Nike

• Previously around ~40x earnings
• Bear-case narrative mentions potential ~-50% downside
• Best-case narrative mentions around mid-20% returns (described verbally)

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Risk management & portfolio construction lessons emphasized

• Sizing is central:
  • You don’t need to be right on everything—focus on a durable process and thesis validation
  • Example: Pernod Ricard discussed at ~5% position size
• Competence-based investing:
  • Avoid positions you can’t explain “from A to Z”
  • Don’t rely on superficial YouTube/forum narratives
• Diversification is not a substitute for understanding:
  • Many holdings (e.g., “50 lines”) don’t reduce risk if theses are weak
• Thesis invalidation rule:
  • If your thesis is invalidated, sell
• Avoid catalyst blindness:
  • Cheap unloved stocks can remain cheap without catalysts—factor in catalyst probability and timing

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Disclosures / disclaimers

• No explicit formal “not financial advice” disclaimer is visible in the transcript excerpt.
• Mentoring/coaching framing is present, but no clear legal disclaimer is shown.

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Presenters / sources

• Paul
  • Co-host/portfolio manager
  • Mentioned as having a market finance degree and related experience
  • Runs mentoring alongside the other host
• Leo / Lé(o)
  • Other main presenter
  • Runs the tier-list philosophy/methodology
  • Mentions coaching/school-group context and a school group link