War in Ukraine: Where things stand | Military Analysis - Lex Fridman Podcast

Summary

Michael Kofman assesses that Ukraine’s battlefield performance in 2026 is its strongest since the 2023 summer offensive, while Russia’s ground campaign is performing poorly and has reached diminishing returns. He traces this shift to roughly fall 2025, after Russia held the initiative through much of 2024 and 2025 with a broad, grinding offensive. Ukraine has since conducted localized offensives, gained territory in areas including near Lyman and Zaporizhzhia, and in some places reversed Russian gains from 2025. The battlefield, he argues, is more fluid than the common description of a positional stalemate suggests.

Russia is increasingly relying on a large-scale strike campaign. What began in 2022 with missile attacks on energy infrastructure has expanded to other targets, including warehouses, data centers, schools, medical facilities, shopping malls, and railways. The campaign now uses sustained waves of attack drones as well as missiles. Newer, faster drones are harder to intercept and keep pressure on Ukrainian air defenses and daily life. Kofman warns that strategic bombardment can inflict serious damage but has historically not reliably achieved maximal political aims when ground operations are failing. The economic consequences of the damage to Ukraine remain uncertain, particularly heading into winter.

The main ground fighting is in eastern and southeastern Ukraine. Russian forces are making lower-intensity incursions in the border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv, while fighting continues around Kupyansk and along the Donbas front. Russia’s main effort remains an attempt to capture the remaining parts of Donetsk, including the approaches to Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. Zaporizhzhia is especially active, with Russian forces pushing west of Huliaipole while Ukrainian units have made gains elsewhere in the region. Preston Stewart describes the Donbas “Fortress Belt” as a heavily defended area that has imposed high costs on Russian advances. Kyiv and other cities away from the front remain exposed to long-range strikes.

The speakers describe the modern front as a broad, contested “gray zone,” rather than two continuous lines of troops. Drone surveillance and attacks shape a zone extending several kilometres on either side of the front. Russia tries to penetrate it through small infantry infiltrations and light vehicles such as motorcycles and ATVs; Ukraine combines prepared defenses, mines, and drone units to detect and attack them. Drones account for a large share of casualties, but the speakers stress that they do not operate alone: minefields and artillery slow and disperse attackers, making them more vulnerable to drones. Artillery also provides an important complement when wind, rain, and other poor weather reduce drone effectiveness.

Presenters and Contributors

• Lex Fridman — host
• Michael Kofman — military analyst
• Preston Stewart — military analyst and commentator